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Notes
A Pedigree for Due Process?
Burnham v. Superior Court of California1
The Court's [1989] term, now entering its final month, is bound to produce
more famous cases, more sweeping rulings, more dramatic results than this
little-noticed decision. But as a window on the most fundamental
constitutional debate now taking place within the Court, it would be hard
to top Burnham v. Superior Court of California.
In 1990, the United States Supreme Court squarely examined the doctrine
of transient jurisdiction and in a unanimous decision upheld the constitution-
ality of its use by state courts.4
I. THE FACTS
Petitioner Dennis Burnham (Husband), on writ of certiorari, sought a
'determination from the United States Supreme Court that the California
Superior Court, County of Matin, could not, consistent with the Due Process
Clause of the fourteenth amendment, assert personal jurisdiction over him in
a divorce suit filed by Francie Burnham (Wife).5
1. 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990).
2. N.Y. Times, May 31, 1990, at A20, col. 5.
3. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2105. The label "transient jurisdiction" is used by each
member of the Court and the majority of Commentators who have addressed this issue.
"[The term 'transient jurisdiction' ... refer[s] to jurisdiction premised solely on the
fact that a person is served with process while physically present in the forum State."
Id. at 2120 n.1. (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasis added).
4. Id. at 2119. Although unanimous in their judgment, the Court disagreed
sharply on the appropriate rationale to used. See infra notes 115-233 and accompany-
ing text. It is this disagreement which prevented the Court from issuing a majority
opinion.
5. This action began in the California Superior Court, County of Main, with
Francie Burnham as Petitioner in a divorce suit. This case came before the Supreme
Court, however, as a review of the California Court of Appeal decision denying her
husband, Dennis Burnham, a Writ of Mandate for which he was Petitioner. To avoid-
any confusion, the author of this Note will refer to the parties only as Husband and
Wife.
1
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Husband and Wife were married in 1976 in West Virginia, then moved
to New Jersey where they lived for ten years and raised two children. In
July of 1987, they separated and Wife moved to California with their
children.! In January 1988, Husband traveled to California for business and
to see his children.' On January 24, 1988, as Husband was returning one of
6. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2109.
7. Id. Prior to Wife's moving to California, Husband and Wife entered into a
property settlement agreement. Burnham v. Burnham, Nos. A-1522-88T2, A-5705-
87172 (N.J. Super. Ct., App. Div. July 24, 1989) (affirming trial court's dismissal of
both of Husband's divorce petitions). In an affidavit submitted to the California trial
court, Husband states that both parties were represented by counsel in executing this
agreement. Joint Appendix at 6-7, Burnham (No. 89-44). The agreement disposed of
the parties' property and determined child custody as well as child and spousal support.
Id. It purported to be controlled by New Jersey law and to give New Jersey courts
exclusive jurisdiction to settle disputes regarding visitation and custody of the children.
Id. Husband and Wife further agreed that Wife would institute divorce proceedings
on grounds of "irreconcilable differences." Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2109.
Despite their agreement, in October of 1987 Husband filed an action for divorce
in New Jersey, claiming "desertion." Id. Husband made no attempt to serve Wife
with process until January 30, 1988, after he had been served with Wife's summons
and petition in California. Burnham v. Burnham, Nos. A-1522-88T2, A-5705-87T2
(NJ. Super. Ct., App. Div. July 24, 1989). The New Jersey trial court dismissed
Husband's action by order dated June 3, 1988. Id. Husband refiled his petition and
the trial court dismissed that petition on October 14, 1988. Id.
In an unpublished decision, the appellate division of the New Jersey Superior
Court affirmed both orders of dismissal. Id. Agreeing with the trial court, the
appellate division stated that "[Husband] had deliberately and unfairly manipulated
[Wife] into moving to California so that he could bring his divorce action in New
Jersey where it would be the most convenient for him and most inconvenient for
[her]." Id. Additional considerations of the trial court, adopted by the appellate
division, were Husband's delay in issuing summons, the doctrine of forum non
conveniens and the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act. Burnham v. Burnham,
No. 8896-88 (N.J. Super. Ct. Chanc. Div., Sussex Cty., June 3, 1988) (order dismissing
Husband's divorce petition). The Supreme Court of New Jersey declined to review
this decision of the New Jersey Appellate Division. Burnham v. Burnham, 118 N.J.
194, 570 A.2d 959 (1989).
No mention is made by the Supreme Court of the dismissals of Husband's New
Jersey actions or of the reasons given by the New Jersey trial and appellate courts in
support of those dismissals.
8. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2109. Wife, by affidavit to the trial court, states that
this was the fourth visit to California by Husband after Wife's move. Joint Appendix
at 9, Burnham (No. 89-44). She further states that on each occasion, the visitation was
accompanied by Husband's business activities in the state. Id. Although Husband
denies, by affidavit, having conducted any business in California, he does admit to
having scheduled, for tax purposes, attendance at certain lectures and trade shows to
[Vol. 56
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the children to his wife's residence, he was served with a California summons
and a copy of Wife's divorce petition. 9 Husband then returned to New
Jersey.
0
Husband entered a special appearance in the California Superior Court,
County of Matin," and moved to quash the service of summons or, in the
alternative, to dismiss the action.' 2 Relying on Kulko v. Superior Coure3
and Shaffer v. Heitner,14 Husband argued that he lacked sufficient contacts
with California to support personal jurisdiction over him in a matter unrelated
to his activities in that state.?5 Wife contended that, because Husband had
established a pattern of trips to California, he had sufficient minimum contacts
to support jurisdiction there. 6 Significantly, Wife also argued that personal
service on Husband while he was in California, without more, was sufficient
to confer jurisdiction there.' 7 The trial court determined that it had "jurisdic-
tion, both in rem and in personam, over the subject matter and the parties,
respectively."'"
Husband sought a writ of mandate from the California Court of Appeals,
the state's intermediate appellate court. 19 In an unpublished opinion, the
coincide with his plans to visit his children. Id. at 14.
9. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2109.
10. Id. From January 24, 1988, the date of Husband's service, until May 17,
1988, the date of Wife's affidavit, Wife states that Husband traveled to California, to
see his children and conduct business, on two other occasions. Joint Appendix at 9,
Burnham (No. 89-44).
11. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2109.
12. Joint Appendix at 5, Burnham (No. 89-44).
13. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
14. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
15. Joint Appendix at 7, Burnham (No. 89-44).
16. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Burnham (89-44).
17. Id.
18. Burnham v. Burnham, No. FI-10003 (Super. Ct. Oct. 5, 1988) (order granting
Wife's Motion for Reconsideration; vacating Order of Sept. 8, 1988; and denying, in
its entirety, Husband's Motion to Quash Service of Summons/Dismiss the Action).
In its order dated September 8, 1988, the trial court had ruled that, because
Wife's domicile was California, the court had jurisdiction over the marital status but
could not exercise personal jurisdiction over Husband. Burnham v. Burnham, No. Fl-
10003 (Super. Ct. Sept. 8, 1988).
In its second order the trial court cited, as a basis for its reversal of its earlier
order, the June 3, 1988, order of the New Jersey Superior Court, see supra note 8,
dismissing Husband's divorce petition. Burnham v. Burnham, No. Fl-10003 (Super.
Ct. Oct. 5, 1988).
19. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2109.
1991]
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court of appeals denied Husband's relief.2 The court stated that "personal
presence continues to be a valid jurisdictional predicate for in personam
jurisdiction, and that Shaffer v. Heitner does not compel a contrary conclu-
sion."21 The court of appeals noted that no decision in California or in the
United States Supreme Court has relied on an analysis of the defendant's
contacts when the defendant had been personally served while in the forum
state?' The court cited decisions from other jurisdictions that had considered
this issue and determined that Shaffer did not foreclose assertions of
jurisdiction based on in-state service.? The California Supreme Court
refused Husband's request to review the determination of the court of
appeals.
The United States Suprerhe Court granted Husband's petition for a writ
of certiorari.2s In four separate opinions, and without a majority, the nine
Justices of the Supreme Court employed vastly different rationales in reaching
the same conclusion: personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant who
had been in the state for three days, engaged in activities unrelated to the
pending action, and who was personally served with process while in the state
did not violate "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."26
II. THE CONTROVERSY
Prior to 1977, the idea that a court secured in personam jurisdiction over
a non-resident defendant for no other reason than that the defendant was
served with process while voluntarily present within the forum state was one
of the most fundamental and widely-accepted doctrines in American
20. Burnham v. Burnham, No. A044090, (Calif. Ct. App. Apr. 7, 1989).
21. Id. (citations omitted). It is clear that the court of appeals rested its decision
entirely on the issue of in-state service of process and did not consider Husband's
other contacts, or lack thereof, with California. The only reference made to Husband's
California contacts was that because of "the dual purposes of visitation and conducting
business activities, the imposition of personal jurisdiction in this case will not act to
discourage parental visitation." Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. (citing Amusement Equip., Inc. v. Mordeldt, 779 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1985);
Aluminal Industries, Inc. v. Newtown Commercial Assocs., 89 F.R.D. 326 (S.D.N.Y.
1980); Cariaga v. District Ct., 104 Nev. 544, 762 P.2d 886 (1988); Oxmans' Erwin
Meat Co. v. Blacketer, 86 Wis. 2d 683, 273 N.W.2d 285 (1979).
24. Burnham v. Superior Ct., No. S009795 (Cal. Sup. Ct. June 8, 1989).
25. Burnham v. Superior Ct., 110 S. Ct. 47 (1989).
26. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting
Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
[Vol. 56
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jurisprudence.27 Its roots, arguably, pre-date the founding of our nation.'
It was firmly entrenched bef6re the adoption of the fourteenth amendment29
27. The history of the doctrine of transient jurisdiction has been exhaustively
examined by numerous authors. See generally Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of
Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289
(1956); Hazard,A General Theory of State-CourtJurisdiction, 1965 SuP. Cr. REV. 241
(1965); Wemer, Dropping the Other Shoe: Shaffer v. Heitner and the Demise of
Presence-Oriented Jurisdiction, 45 BROOKLYN L. REV. 565 (1979).
28. Werner, supra note 27, at 568-72. See also J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON
THE CoNFLICr OF LAWS §§ 530-538, 543, 554 (1846). In the early English common
law courts, jurisdiction in civil cases was asserted by arresting the defendant and
incarcerating him until he posted a bond large enough to cover any judgment entered
against him. R. CASAD, JURISDICtiON AND FORUM SELECTION § 4.03 (1988). This
use of the writ of capias ad respondendum served the dual role of demonstrating the
court's power over the defendant, that is, the forum sovereign's ability to enforce the
judgments of its courts without reliance on foreign governments, and to demonstrate
that the defendant had received fair notice of the suit. R. CASAD, JURISDICTION IN
CIVIL AcrIONS, TERRITORIAL BASIS AND PROCESS LIMITATIONS ON JURISDICTION OF
STATE AND FEDERAL COuRTs para. 2.02(2)(a) (1983) [hereinafter CASAD]. This
procedure continued to serve these two purposes in America only in its more symbolic
form: personal service. Id. at para. 2.02(2)(b).
One commentator, however, rejects the idea that the rule has any significant
history prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Pennoyer. "Only when transient
service, hitherto a harmless adjunct of convenient jurisdiction, thus came to be
required for the establishment of personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants, did
such service also become generally sufficient for this purpose." Ehrenzweig, supra
note 27, at 292 (emphasis in original).
Professor Ehrenzwieg's analysis is, perhaps, more readily understood in light of
his European background. Transient jurisdiction is denounced universally outside the
common law countries. See generally Juenger, Judicial Jurisdiction in the United
States and in the European Communities: A Comparison, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1195
(1984). The Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition of Judgments
in Civil and Commercial Matters "defined the appropriate jurisdictional bases as a
matter of supranational law," binding on all member states. Id. at 1206. The
Convention declared that judgments over nonresident defendants, who are citizens of
member states, that are based on transient jurisdiction are unenforceable among
member European states. Id. at 1197, 1206.
29. In Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), decided prior to the more familiar
language of the fourteenth amendment, the Court reviewed and decided the case based
on "well-established principles of public law." Id. at 722. Articulations of, these
principles are numerous in both state and federal courts prior to 1869. See, e.g., Mills
v. Duryee, 11 U.S. 481, 486 (1813) (an "eternal principle[] of justice which never
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and formed the backdrop for the United States Supreme Court's early
constitutional reviews of state courts' assertions of jurisdiction.1a
In 1945, with the Supreme Court's ruling in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington,3 constitutional review of state court jurisdiction entered the
modem era. The standards announced in that case, and the later Supreme
Court cases applying them, have spawned extensive state legislation, inspired
volumes of scholarly commentary and enumerable pages of judicial decisions
devoted to discussions of the "minimum contacts" test. The doctrine of
transient jurisdiction, however, was relatively unaffected by this storm of
analysis which centered only around extraterritorial service'
Transient jurisdiction's relative immunity from scrutiny ended in 1977 3
with the Supreme Court's decision in Shaffer v. Heitner.34 In sweeping
language, the Court stated that "all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must
be evaluated according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its
progeny."S While the facts of Shaffer required the Court to decide only the
continued validity of the doctrine of in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction,
36
the constitutionality of transient jurisdiction was to come under substantial
debate as a result of this case and the language quoted above. 7
30. E.g., Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733; Wilson v. Seligman, 144 U.S. 41, 46 (1892);
Goldey v. Morning News, 156 U.S. 518, 521 (1895).
31. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
32. The Court in International Shoe explicitly limited its holding to cases in
which the defendant "be not present within the territory of the forum." International
Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
33. Maltz, Sovereign Authority, Fairness, and Personal Jurisdiction: The Case
For the Doctrine of Transient Jurisdiction, 66 WASH. U.LQ. 671, 673 (1988).
34. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
35. Id. at 212 (emphasis added). In a footnote immediately after this assertion,
the Court noted that while no reassessment of the facts of prior cases, including
Pennoyer, was necessary, "[t]o the extent that prior decisions are inconsistent with this
standard, they are overruled." Id. at 212 n.39.
36. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 189-96.
37. See Bernstine, Shaffer v. Heitner: A Death Warrant for the Transient Rule
of In Personam Jurisdiction?, 25 VILL. L Rav. 38, 38-45 (1979); Maltz, supra note
33, at 672-74; Posnak, A Uniform Approach to Judicial Jurisdiction After World-Wide
and the Abolition of the "Gotcha" Theory, 30 EMoRY LJ. 729, 732-37 (1981);
Comment, The "TransientRule" ofPersonalJurisdiction: A Well-Intentioned Concept
That Has Overstayed Its Welcome, 73 MARQ. L RE v. 181, 181-87 (1989); Note, The
Physical Presence Basis of Personal Jurisdiction Ten Years After Shaffer v. Heitner:
A Rule in Search of a Rationale, 62 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 713, 713-17 (1987).
[Vol. 56
6




With "virtual unanimity," commentators decried the continued existence
of transient jurisdiction m The doctrine was attacked, not on its conceptual
basis, 9 but on its inconsistency4° with modem methods of analysis and its
potential for producing unfairness in a highly mobile society.4 '
Professor Vernon of the University of Iowa, in analyzing the impact of
Shaffer, argued that transient presence as the single-factor basis for jurisdiction
was no longer consistent with due process.42 He pointed out that presence
in the forum state contributes no more to a modem constitutional inquiry than
does ownership of property there.43  According to Vernon, temporary
presence within a state is substantially weaker constitutionally than is
domicile, the other traditional basis of general jurisdiction. 4  Domicile at
least carries the reciprocal rights and duties stressed by the Supreme Court45
in Milliken v. Meyer.4 Further, a defendant is unlikely to anticipate having
38. Posnak, supra note 37, at 744.
39. The notable exception to this is, of course, Ehrenzweig, supra note 27.
40. Posnak, supra note 37, at 744-45.
41. Id; see also Bernstine, supra note 37, at 62; Brilmayer, Haverkamp, Logan,
Lynch, Neuwirth and O'Brien, A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 TEx. L.
REV. 723, 752-55 (1988) [hereinafter Brilmayer].
42. Vernon, Single-Factor Bases of ln Personam Jurisdiction: A Speculation on
the Impact of Shaffer v. Heitner, 1978 WASH. U.L.Q. 273, 302-03 (1978).
43. Id. at 303.
44. Id at 302.
45. Id
46. 311 U.S. 457, 462-64 (1940). The Court held that "[d]omicile in the state is
alone sufficient to bring an absent defendant within the reach of the state's jurisdiction
for purposes of a personal judgment by means of appropriate substituted service." Id.
at 462. This case involved a full faith and credit challenge in which the Colorado
Supreme Court declined to enforce a Wyoming judgment, charging substantive error.
The Supreme Court held that the Colorado courts were barred from reviewing the
merits of the underlying case. After reviewing jurisdiction in the Wyoming action and
declaring it proper, the Supreme Court ordered the Colorado courts to enforce the
judgment.
This case is often cited today as the source of the "fair play and substantial
justice" standard quoted in International Shoe. See supra note 26 and accompanying
text. Interestingly, the Court, in Milliken, cites McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90
(1917), as the source of this language. In McDonald, another full faith and credit
challenge, the Court sustained the challenge when the basis of personal jurisdiction was
substituted service of an absent defendant. The defendant in McDonald, although
technically a domiciliary of the forum state, had left the state and did not intend to
return. The court stated:
1991]
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to defend suit in a forum over claims unrelated to his transitory presence
there. 47
These inconsistencies, another author notes, are best illustrated by
hypothetically inserting the transient jurisdiction issue into prior Supreme
Court cases.' Shaffer, for example, denied Delaware quasi in rem jurisdic-
tion despite the state's asserted strong interest in the suit and the defendants'
asserted ownership of property located there. The fact that the defendants had
each been served in Delaware while playing in a charity golf tournament or
attending a board meeting should not alter the outcome.49 In Kulko v.
Superior Court of California,5° the Court denied California jurisdiction,
despite that forum's strong interest, because the defendant had not purposeful-
ly availed himself of the benefits of California. This commentator again
points out that the case should not be altered to any constitutionally significant
degree by serving the defendant in an airplane over California on his way to
Hawaii.5'
Other authors found transient jurisdiction inconsistent with a defendant's
constitutionally guaranteed5 2 right to travel.53 Potential defendants might
curb their travel to avoid service of process, avoiding any states in which they
would not care to litigate. 4 The Supreme Court has consistently held that
a state may not even discourage travel in or through its territory without a
justifying substantial interest.55 To these authors it seemed doubtful such an
interest could be demonstrated because, by definition, a state lacks any
No doubt there may be some extension of the means of acquiring jurisdic-
tion beyond service or appearance, but the foundation should be borne in
mind.... [G]reat caution should be used not to let fiction [of substituted
service] deny the fair play that can be secured only by a pretty close
adhesion to fact.... To dispense with personal service the substitute that
is most likely to reach the defendant is the least that ought to be required
if substantial justice is to be done.
Id. at 91-92 (emphasis added). It is ironic that the Court in this case, having decided
only whether deficiencies in service rise to the level of a violation of due process,
should spawn the language which was to become the touchstone of personal
jurisdiction analysis.
47. Vernon, supra note 42, at 302-03.
48. Posnak, supra note 37, at 746.
49. Id. at 747.
50. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
51. Posnak, supra note 37, at 748.
52. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
53. See Brilmayer, supra note 41, at 753; Comment, supra note 37, at 210.
54. Comment, supra note 37, at 210.
55. See Brilmayer, supra note 41, at 753 and cases cited therein.
[Vol. 56
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significant connection with the suit in cases where jurisdiction is based solely
on transient presence."
The broad language employed by Justice Marshall, writing for the Court
in Shaffer, has provided commentators with ample ammunition to counter
arguments favoring the "bright line" nature of the transient jurisdiction
doctrine.57 Justice Marshall stated that to sacrifice the due process protection
offered by a "minimum contacts" analysis in exchange for the certainty of
"bright line" rules was to pay too high a price.58 One author had even
suggested that state courts might realize a net decrease in jurisdiction-related
litigation 9 due to the many complex corollary rules surrounding transient
jurisdiction which would also be abrogated. 60
Commentators rested the bulk of their arguments, however, on the
asserted potential for unfairness created by transient jurisdiction. It is true that
often transient jurisdiction produces jurisdiction in a forum with which the
defendant has other, perhaps sufficient, contacts.61 It is equally true,
however, that our increasingly mobile society makes this less probable today
than at any other time.62 Early in the history of the doctrine of transient
jurisdiction, this unfairness to a defendant who. was served while only
temporarily in the forum state could, arguably, be seen only to have been a
quid pro quo for the absolute ban on extraterritorial service which protected
him.63 Any fair exchange, however, has been lost with the unanimous
enactment of state long-arm statutes after International Shoe.'
Professor Posnak, of Mercer University, argued that the obvious
unfairness to the defendant of having to defend in an inconvenient forum'
56. Id.
57. Posnak, supra note 37, at 766.
58. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 211.
59. Posnak, supra note 37, at 766.
60. See infra notes 238-45 and accompanying text. These rules are primarily in
the area of immunity from service while present in a state. Comment, supra note 37,
at 198. These immunities vary by circumstance and among the states. See 4 C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 1076-81 (2d ed. 1987)
[hereinafter WRIGHT & MILLER]. Typically, these rules hold that a party or witness
present in a state for purposes of one suit is not subject to service of another suit. See
Comment, supra ,note 37, at 198-201 and cases cited therein. This rule may extend
to pre-trial discovery visits and settlement negotiations as well. Id. at 200. Courts will
also generally extend immunity to defendants fraudulently induced to entered the state
for service of process. Id. at 201-02.
61. Berustine, supra note 37, at 60.
62. Id.; Wemer, supra note 27, at 588.
63. Posnak, supra note 37, at 736.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 757.
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often obscures more subtle dangers. First, where transient presence is the only
basis of personal jurisdiction, the forum state might have no interest in the
litigation.' Second, because the court might be required to apply law with
which it lacks expertise, the court is more likely to commit error.67 To
support this assertion, Prof. Posnak raises Faunteroy v. Lum,6 in which
Missouri courts, exercising transient jurisdiction, "seized upon the opportunity
to misconstrue Mississippi law."6 In a subsequent action on the judgment,
the Mississippi courts had no option, under the full faith and credit clause, but
to uphold this clearly erroneous interpretation of state law. °
The doctrine of forum non convenien, 71 some commentators have
stated, is sufficient to alleviate the harshness of the transient jurisdiction
rule.72  Others feel that this doctrine is neither sufficient7 nor appropri-
ate74 to protect a non-resident's constitutional right of due process. The
application of this doctrine is discretionary, difficult to review and, as its name
implies, concerned with the convenience of the parties rather than the rights
of the defendant.75
The Reporters of the Restatement of Conflicts (Second) have not been
unmoved by the flurry of debate over transient jurisdiction since Shaffer. The
Restatement declares that "[a] state has the power to exercise judicial
jurisdiction over an individual who is present within its territory" even though
that presence be only "for an.instant."7 6 The revised draft, proposed in 1986,
would discard the transient jurisdiction doctrine by adding the language
"unless the individuals relationship to the state is so attenuated as to make the
66. Id. at 751-52.
67. 1& at 753. See also Bernstine, supra note 37, at 66.
68. 210 U.S. 230 (1908).
69. Posnak, supra note 37, at 753.
70. Id. Professor Posnak's argument is, perhaps, overstated given the paucity of
such examples as Fauntleroy and frequency with which conflict of laws rules require
a state to apply another's law. His point remains, however, that transient jurisdiction
increases the risks of these incidents by granting jurisdiction to courts having no
particular interest in the litigation.
71. "Under [this] doctrine, a court that has jurisdiction of the persona and subject
matter, and that is a court of proper venue, may nevertheless decline to exercise its
jurisdiction in a given case if that court would be a seriously inconvenient forum." R.
CASAD, supra note 28, at para. 1.04.
72. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 28 comment a (1975);
Bernstine, supra note 37, at 66; Ehrenzweig, supra note 27, at 305; Posnak, supra note
37, at 759.
73. Werner, supra note 27, at 590.
74. Brilmayer, supra note 41, at 754-55.
75. Comment, supra note 37, at 202-04.
76. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAws § 28 (1975).
[Vol. 56
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exercise of such jurisdiction unreasonable."'' This drastic turnaround was
made in consideration of the Supreme Court's ruling in Shaffer.78
Legal discussions are seldom unanimous, however, and Professor Maltz
has advocated the continued viability of transient jurisdiction. 79 He acknowl-
edged the frustration many commentators feel in addressing this doctrine and
traced it to the fact that the "[t]he dispute centers on the most basic concepts
of sovereign authority and fairness... [which] are not subject to proof or
disproof."'  These concepts are the bases upon which arguments are built,
but do not, themselves, make very satisfying topics of argument."' Professor
Malz, however, criticized attacks on transient jurisdiction predicated on
preventing actual inconvenience to a defendant as plainly inconsistent with the
Supreme Court's pattern of analysis in jurisdictional cases.
Professor Malz identified two concepts central to the Supreme Court's
analyses which preclude identifying fairness as the constitutional foundation
for the personal jurisdiction requirement. 82 The first concept rests on the
proposition that the Court consistently has held that Congress has the power
to create nationwide personal jurisdiction for federal courts.83 The second
concept postulates that due process is concerned only with whether a
defendant can be compelled to cross a state line to defend an action, not with
how far he must travel.84 The same contacts of a Missouri defendant,
sufficient to force her to defend in Illinois, would be sufficient to force her to
defend in Alaska. Professor Maltz finds the doctrine of jurisdiction consistent
with the Supreme Court's "sovereignty-related analysis" s and with the
historical roots of fairness in our system.86
A thoughtful and exhaustive treatment of the controversy over transient
jurisdiction has, most recently, been provided by Erich Heichel.87 After
tracing both the historical development of transient jurisdiction and the rise of
77. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNFLICrs OF LAWS § 28 (Proposed Revisions
1986). "Jurisdiction will be lacking, however, when the sole basis for its exercise is
the momentary presence within the State of the individual involved." Id. at comment
b.
78. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 28 comment b (Proposed
Revisions 1986).
79. Maltz, supra note 33, at 701.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 686.
83. Id. at 686-87. See infra notes 267-69 and accompanying text.
84. Maltz, supra note 33, at 687.
85. Id. at 697.
86. Id. at 701.
87. Note, supra note 37.
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"minimum contacts" analysis under International Shoe, Mr. Heichel came to
the reasonable conclusion that, while the old rationale for the transient
jurisdiction doctrine should be abandoned, the rule itself should be sal-
vaged?0 He advocated the doctrine's continued use under a "purposeful
availment" analysis in which state courts would take in-state service as prima
facie evidence of a jurisdictional nexus, subject to the defendant's right to
rebut with a showing that jurisdiction would be unreasonable.8 9
B. State and Lower Federal Courts
After the United States Supreme Court's decision in Shaffer, many state
courts re-examined the doctrine of transient jurisdiction. Every state supreme
court faced with the issue upheld the doctrine.9 A minority of lower state
and federal courts addressing the issue have found, based primarily on the
Supreme Court's language in Shaffer, that the doctrine is no longer constitu-
tional. 9' Three illustrative opinions are discussed below.
In 1985, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Amusement
Equipment Inc. v. Mordelt,92 reversed a district court judgment and held "that
the rule of transient jurisdiction has life left in it yet."'  Referring to
transient jurisdiction as "an historical truism,"94 the court conceded that
Shaffer required that it be re-analyzed under International Shoe.9' Finding
that International Shoe itself created an exception for transient jurisdiction, the
88. Id. at 730.
89. Id. at 731.
90. Hutto v. Plagens, 254 Ga. 512,330 S.E.2d 341 (1985); Klavan v. Klavan, 405
Mass. 1105, 544 N.E.2d 863 (1989); Read v. Sonat Offshore Drilling, Inc., 515 So. 2d
1229 (Miss. 1987); Cariaga v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 104 Nev. 544, 762 P.2d 886
(1988); Lockert v. Breedlove, 321 N.C. 66, 361 S.E.2d 581 (1987); Carr v. Carr, 375
S.E.2d 190 (W. Va. 1988); Oxmans' Erwin Meat Co. v. Blacketer, 86 Wis. 2d 683,
273 N.W.2d 285 (1979); Nutri-West v. Gibson, 764 P.2d 693 (Wyo. 1988).
91. Nehemiah v. Athletics Congress, 765 F.2d 42, 46-47 (3d Cir. 1985); Harold
M. Pitman Co. v. Typecraft Software, 626 F. Supp. 305, 310-14 (N.D. Ill. 1986);
Schreiber v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 448 F. Supp. 1079, 1088-91 (D. Kan. 1978), rev'd
on other grounds, 611 F.2d 790 (10th Cir. 1979); Duehring v. Vasquez, 490 So. 2d
667, 671 (La. Ct. App. 1986); Bershaw v. Sarbacher, 40 Wash. App. 653, 657, 700
P.2d 347, 349 (1985).
92. 779 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1985).
93. Id. at 271.
94. Id. at 267.
95. Id. at 269. In doing so, the court noted the irony in having to re-evaluate this
procedure, whose roots are found in a time when travel was arduous, for unfairness in
a time when travel is "elastic, expansive, and inexpensive." Id. at 268.
[Vol. 56
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court turned to Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites' for
guidance.97 The test in Insurance Corp. of Ireland "requires that 'mainte-
nance of the suit.., not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.'" 98 The court reasoned that, because physical presence is one of the
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice which govern jurisdic-
tional inquiries, 99 "[w]hen the defendant is present within the forum state,
notice of the suit through proper service of process is all the process to which
he is due."'m
In Humphrey v. Langford,1°' the Georgia Supreme Court found that
Georgia courts had personal jurisdiction over the South Carolina defendant
after he was personally served in Georgia.'02 In upholding transient jurisdic-
tion, the court cited as "compelling reasons" the impracticality of having
varying classifications of "sojourners" in the state: those subject to jurisdic-
tion and those not. 103 The court also noted that "[d]ue process is not solely
for the... defendant" and that without transient jurisdiction some defendants
could not be sued at all." The court found that the United States Supreme
Court, in International Shoe, expressly exempted transient jurisdiction from
96. 456 U.S. 694 (1982).
97. Amusement Equip. Co. v. Mordelt, 779 F.2d 264, 269 ( 5th Cir. 1985).
98. Insurance Corp. of Ireland, 456 U.S. at 703 (citations omitted).
99. Mordelt, 770 F.2d at 269.
100. Id. at 270.
101. 246 Ga. 732, 273 S.E.2d 22 (1980).
102. Id. The defendant had entered Georgia to go bowling. Id. See also
Drewko, Humphrey v. Langford: Transient Jurisdiction Reaffirmed, 15 J. MARSHALL
L REV. 237, 241-42 (1982).
103. Humphrey, 246 Ga. at 734, 273 S.E.2d at 24. "Where does a court draw the
line between sojourners here for an evening of bowling and sojourners who commute
to the state on a daily basis?" Id. This argument is not persuasive in that this,
distinction is precisely what courts may draw when exercising "minimum contacts"
jurisdiction under their long-arm statutes The court also cites as compelling reasons
for the doctrine of transient jurisdiction situations in which the fact that some
defendants have no residence, will flee from personal service, will terminate an in-state
residence in order to establish residence in a more favorable jurisdiction, or will
conspire with defendants of other states under circumstances preventing both from
being subject to jurisdiction in the same court. Id.
It should be noted that "[b]y statute, a nonresident, by his mere presence in this
state, is subject to the state's jurisdiction." Drewko, supra note 102, at 243 (citing GA.
CODE ANN. 1 15-202 (1971)) ("The jurisdiction of this State and its laws extend to all
persons while within its limits, whether as citizens, denizens, or temporary sojourn-
ers.").
104. Humphrey, 246 Ga. at 734, 273 S.E.2d at 24.
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any "minimum contacts" analysis."05 The court declined to overrule tran-
sient jurisdiction on the basis of the dicta language in Shaffer and the cases
following it because they "did not mandate such a result."'
°
InNutri-West v. Gibson, the Supreme Court of Wyoming re-examined the
question of transient jurisdiction and found the doctrine was still proper.l
The court agreed with Shaffer that all assertions of jurisdiction should be
governed by International Shoe."° The court found, however, that this did
not mean that a "minimum contacts" analysis was appropriate.' 9 Relying
on the language in International Shoe that applied the minimum contacts test
only when the defendant is "not present within the territory of the forum,"1 0
the court found that transient jurisdiction met the general standard of fair play
and substantial justice."' It met this standard because jurisdiction based on
presence is, itself, traditionalin The court closed its discussion by stating,
"We are unwilling to reject this established jurisdictional principle without
direction from a higher authority. " 1i
III. THE BURNHAM DECISION
The stage was set for the Supreme Court to address the constitutional
viability of transient jurisdiction. The battle lines had been drawn. For a
decade and longer, and with a nearly unanimous voice, scholars and
commentators had counseled an end to this doctrine, With an equally
unanimous voice, state and lower federal courts held the doctrine constitution-
al as a fundamental tenet of American jurisprudence.
105. Id. at 733, 273 S.E.2d at 23-24.
106. Id. at 733-34, 273 S.E.2d at 24. This case is noted here, not for the
persuasiveness of its legal analysis, see supra note 103, but rather as evidence of the
hostility state courts feel towards attempts to divest them of their jurisdiction. "This
sovereign state has an adequate court system and is capable of rendering justice
between litigants as well as any court system." Humphrey, 246 Ga. at 734,273 S.E.2d
at 24. This type of emphatic statement of parochial pride can be found implied in
many of the state court opinions upholding transient jurisdiction.
107. Nutri-West v. Gibson, 764 P.2d 693, 696 (Wyo. 1988).
108. Id. at 695.
109. l&
110. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
111. Nutri-West, 764 P.2d at 695-696.
112. 1I
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To address this issue, the Supreme Court chose a case from the Fifth
Division of the First Appellate District of the California Court of Appeals.""
Sharply divided on the rationale to be used, the Court was unanimous in its
judgment affirming the superior court and its assertion of transient jurisdiction.
The split revealed by the two principal opinions, authored by Justice
Scalia and Justice Brennan, strikes to the heart of due process analysis. At
issue was the power of the Supreme Court to strike down, as violative of the
Due Process Clause, a state court procedure which enjoys widespread
acceptance and a long-standing history. Justice Brennan maintained that the
Court has this power, while Justice Scalia determined that a sufficient
"pedigree" precludes Supreme Court review. Justice White and Justice
Stevens refused to enter this debate and wrote separately, concurring in the
judgment. Each of these opinions is discussed separately below.
A. Justice Scalia 5
Justice Scalia upheld the practice of transient jurisdiction based on his
survey of its history and continued broad-based acceptance." 6 This "pedi-
gree"" 7 not only supports the Court's decision, states Justice Scalia, it
prohibits the Court from conducting any independent review of the doctrine
under the Due Process Clause." 8
. Justice Scalia, announcing the judgment of the court,"9 began with a
brief recitation of the facts. 120 He then began his analysis in this case by
114. Supra notes 18-26 and accompanying text.
115. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2109-19. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Kennedy join Justice Scalia in his opinion. Id. Justice White joins Justice Scalia
except for his discussion of Shaffer, id. at 2115-17, and his "few words in response to
Justice Brennan's concurrence." Id. at 2117-19. The exact point at which Justice
White's analysis departs from Justice Scalia's opinion and the rationale for this
departure are discussed in this Note in Section 11(D).
116. Id. at 2115.
117. Id. at 2116.
118. Md at 2116-17.
119. Id. at 2109.
120. Id. Husband's divorce action filed in New Jersey is mentioned, but not the
disposition of that action. Id. There is no discussion of the frequency of Husband's
trips to California or the extent to which these trips were business related. But see
supra notes 8-10. This is consistent with the Court's desire to keep the decision
narrowly focused on the issue of transient jurisdiction despite any peculiarities in the
facts of the case as presented.
The parties and their circumstances, except when attributing certain arguments
or rebutting Justice Brennan's rationales, are not mentioned again in the balance of
Justice Scalia's opinion. This is consistent with Justice Scalia's contention that no
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reviewing the criteria used to review state court assertions of personal
jurisdiction prior to the fourteenth amendment.' 21 . The well-established
principles of public law,m found Justice Scalia, were that a state had power
over the persons and property within that state, and could rightly subject any
person found within its borders, no, matter how briefly, to the personal
jurisdiction of its courts. m Justice Scalia then cited Justice Story for the
proposition that this black letter law of American courts also was grounded
firmly in English law.1' Justice Story's commentaries were relied upon by
many state courts.m Personal service on the defendant while present in the
forum state was viewed, prior to 1868, as the sine qua non of personal
jurisdiction.' Justice Scalia concluded, therefore, that long before the first
due process analysis of personal jurisdiction occurred in Pennoyer, transient
jurisdiction was "among the most firmly established principles of personal
jurisdiction in American tradition."'' 7
Justice Scalia next considered the impact of the watershed case of
Pennoyer v. Neff.12s The "principles of public law" had become embodied
in the Due Process Clause.m For an in personam judgment to be valid
under the constitution, a defendant "must be brought within [the court's]
jurisdiction by service of process within the State, or his voluntary appear-
ance."'M The rigid requirements of presence or consent under Pennoyer
fact-based analysis of the fairness of transient jurisdiction in this, or any other case,
is appropriate. I& at 2116.
121. Id. at 2109.
122. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722.
123. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2110.
124. Id. at 2111 (citing J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
§§ 530-538, 543, 554 (1846)).
125. Id Justice Scalia concedes that "[r]ecent scholarship has suggested that
English tradition was not as clear as Story thought." Id. (citations omitted). Justice
Scalia insists, however, that the accuracy of this understanding is not as important to
the current analysis as is the pervasiveness of this belief. Id.
126. 1L at 2113-14. To support this, Justice Scalia cites extensive state court and
United State Supreme Court cases culminating in the "wel-established principles of
public law." Id. (citing Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722). International Shoe and its progeny
stand only for the proposition that personal service on the defendant while he is
present in the forum state is no longer constitutionally required. Id. at 2114. "[T]he
defendant's litigation-related 'minimum contacts' may take the place of physical
presence as the basis of jurisdiction." Id.
127. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2110.
128. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
129. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2114.
130. Md (citing Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733).
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were applied by the Supreme Court, both as a matter of due process and as
a "fundamental principl[e] of jurisprudence.""13
Justice Scalia then traced the fictionalization of these concepts which
took place as the nation, and the courts, moved into the twentieth century.'
Advances in commerce, travel and communications produced this "inevitable
relaxation of the strict limits on state jurisdiction.""1 These advances
required methods for constitutionally asserting personal jurisdiction over
defendants who neither consented nor were physically present in the state for
service of process."4 Substituted service for nonresident motorists135 and
requirements of in-state agents as a condition of allowing nonresident
corporations to transact business within a state 136 typified the Court's
attempts to stretch Pennoyer to fit modern needs.137
The Court in International Shoe abandoned these fictions and determined
that due process does not require strict adherence to the "presence or consent"
doctrine of Pennoyer."3 The Court provided a method of testing novel
approaches to jurisdiction on their own merits. 39 Critical to Justice Scalia's
analysis is that the analysis of a defendant's minimum contacts was expressly
limited to situations where the defendant "be not present within the territory
of the forum.' °" The Court simply held that jurisdiction over a non-resident
defendant, neither present nor consenting, may, in certain cases, not "offend
'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' "141
This fundamental distinction between novel (extraterritorial service) and
traditional (in-state service or consent) methods of asserting personal
jurisdiction over non-resident defendants is the heart of Justice Scalia's
analysis. 42 For the Court to determine that transient jurisdiction, which
helped to define the standard of "traditional notions of fair play and substantial
131. Id. (citing Wilson v. Seligman, 144 U.S. 41, 46 (1892)).
132. Id.
133. Id. (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 260 (1958) (Black, J.,
dissenting)).
134. Id.
135. This concept was upheld in Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927),
under Pennoyer's consent analysis.
136. This requirement was upheld in Philadelphia & Reading R.R. v. McKibbin,
243 U.S. 264, 265 (1917), as an extension of Pennoyer's "presence" analysis.
137. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2114.
138. Id. at 2114.
139. Id.
140. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
141. Id.
142. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2115.
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justice,"'143 is now unconstitutional under that very standard would be
"perverse."' 44
Justice Scalia next addressed the argument that Shaffer precluded any
pedigree-based analysis when the Court in that case stated "that all assertions
of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set
forth in International Shoe and its progeny."'145 Justice Scalia discredited
this argument as "wrench[ing] out of its context our statement in Shaffer."'"
The assertions of jurisdiction referred to must be read in light of the language
preceding the passage quoted. 4  The Court was merely discarding "[t]he
fiction that an assertion of jurisdiction over property is anything but an
assertion of jurisdiction over the owner."'" Justice Scalia found that Shaffer
determined only that every assertion of jurisdiction over an absent defen-
dant 49 be treated the same, regardless of the latin label historically attached
to it.' "  This rationale, stated Justice Scalia, cannot support the proposition
that defendants served in the forum state should be treated the same as
defendants not so served.15'
Justice Scalia, however, acknowledged the distinct difference between his
analytical approach and that employed by the Court in Shaffer."2 Justice
Marshall, writing for the Court in Shaffer, undertook an independent analysis
of the desirability and fairness of the doctrine of quasi in rem jurisdiction.153
Justice Scalia undertook no such independent analysis, nor did he consider it
appropriate in light of the continued broad-based support for transient
jurisdiction.'" This inquiry might be appropriate, found Justice Scalia,
when the "ancient form" 5 5 being perpetuated is one unique to a single state
or currently employed by only a small number of states, as was the device in
143. Id
144. Id This is so, qualifies Justice Scalia, at least of an "American jurisdictional
practice [which] is, moreover, not merely old; it is continuing." Id. at 2113. This
qualification by Justice Scalia seems to be in anticipation of his attempt to distinguish
the quasi in rem procedure stricken down by Shaffer as one endorsed by only a single
state. See infra notes 154-58 and accompanying text.
145. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 212.
146. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2115.
147. Id
148. Id. at 2116 (citing Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 212).
149. Id. at 2115.





155. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 212.
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Shaffer. Justice Scalia, in short, has determined that transient jurisdiction is
a touchstone of jurisdictional analysis.5 6 No independent inquiry into the
desirability of this doctrine is proper or necessary. 7 "[ilts validation is its
pedigree, as the phrase 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice'
makes clear.""
B. Justice Brennan 9
Justice Brennan found, as did Justice Scalia, that the use of transient
jurisdiction by state courts is constitutional. 1"° He disagreed vehemently,
however, with Justice Scalia's method of analysis and conclusion that the
Court lacks authority to declare the doctrine unconstitutional.16 1 Justice
Brennan contended that the analysis employed by Justice Scalia is precluded
by the Court's decision in Shaffer.62 To Brennan, the "far more sensible
construct" i" of International Shoe and its progeny must be applied in each
review of an exercise of personal jurisdiction.'6 Characterizing Justice
Scalia's attempts to distinguish Shaffer' s as "nimble gymnastics," Justice
Brennan classified Justice Scalia's opinion as unfaithful to precedent.' 66
Embarking on the independent analysis he believes is necessitated by
Shaffer, Justice Brennan began by recognizing that history, or pedigree, while
not dispositive, is relevant in determining the continued constitutionality of
transient jurisdiction. Justice Brennan, however, was much less certain than
Justice Scalia of the jurisprudential origins of transient jurisdiction and
156. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2115.
157. Id. "[That which], in substance, has been immemorially the actual law of
the land... therefor[e] is due process of law." Id. (citing Hurtado v. California, 110
U.S. 516, 528-29 (1884) (conviction by a state on an information alone, without a
grand jury indictment, held valid under due process review)).
158. Id. at 2116 (citing International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316) (emphasis in
original).
159. l at 2120-26. Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and O'Connor join Justice
Brennan in his opinion, concurring in the Court's judgment.
160. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2120.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 219 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) ("[T]he minimum-contacts analysis developed in International Shoe . . .
represents a far more sensible construct for the exercise of state-court jurisdiction than
the patchwork of legal and factual fictions that has been generated from the decision
in Pennoyer v. Neff.").
164. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2120 (citing Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 212).
165. See supra notes 154-58 and accompanying text.
166. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2122.
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characterized them as "murky.""6 7 Regardless of its origin, however, Justice
Brennan found that the clear understanding now, and for at least a century, is
that jurisdiction in the first instance is based upon geography."6 The
relevancy of the background of transient jurisdiction, Justice Brennan stated,
is that it "provides a defendant voluntarily present in a particular state today
'clear notice that [he] is subject to suit' in the forum."'69 Therefore, because
transient jurisdiction is consistent with reasonable expectations, Justice
Brennan found that a strong presumption of constitutionality is justified. 70
Justice Brennan next turned to the requirement of "purposeful avail-
ment"' 7' and determined that Husband had enjoyed "significant benefits
provided by [California]. " 172 These benefits were police and fire protection,
emergency medical services, use of roads and waterways and the fruits of
California's economy.' Under the Constitution, California may not
167. Id. at 2124. Convinced by the scholars cited by Justice Scalia who suggest
that Justice Story's analysis was wrong, see supra note 125, Justice Brennan
determined that transient jurisdiction was a "stranger to the common law." Burnham,
110 S. Ct. at 2122. Justice Brennan further found that transient jurisdiction was
"rather weakly implanted in American jurisprudence" at the time of the adoption of the
fourteenth amendment and was not widely accepted until after the Court's decision in
Pennoyer. i at 2122-24.
These statements raised the scholastic ire in Justice Scalia who responded, in his
opinion, with no less than twenty-five citations to state court cases which evidence the
acceptance of transient jurisdiction, through holdings, dicta and implication, between
the years of 1819 and 1930. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2111-12. Justices Scalia and
Brennan directly locked horns over three cases: Coleman's Appeal, 75 Pa. 441 (1874);
Gardner v. Thomas 14 Johns. 134 (N.Y. 1817); Molony v. Dows, 8 Abb. Pr. 316
(N.Y. Common Pleas 1859). Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2112 n.3, 2123 n.9.
No clear winner emerges from this "battle of the footnotes." Justice Brennan,
however, may well only have goaded Justice Scalia into this discussion to illustrate
that the history-bound analysis proffered by Justice Scalia is not without it own
substantially subjective aspects.
168. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2124. Justice Brennan points out that at least seven
of the cases cited by Justice Scalia stated the rule in either "dictum or situations where
factors other than in-state service supported the exercise of jurisdiction." Id. at 2124
n.10. Justice Scalia responds that personal service was the sole basis for the judgment
in each case and any alternative bases, apparent to us now using contemporary notions,
is irrelevant to the inquiry. Id. at 2111 n.2.
169. Id. at 2124 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.
286, 297 (1980)) (emphasis in original).
170. Id.
171. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985).
172. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2125.
173. Id. While there is nothing in the facts stating which of these Husband
actually used, it is uncontroverted that they were available to him on each of his visits
[Vol. 56
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discriminate against transient visitors to the state in denying them the
protection of its laws or, subject to the doctrine of forum non conveniens,
access to its courts.174 This last factor, access to the courts, was especially
significant to Justice Brennan because "[w]ithout transient jurisdiction, an
asymmetry would arise: a transient would have the full benefit of the power
of the forum State's courts as a plaintiff while retaining immunity from their
authority as a defendant."'175
Justice Brennan next analyzed the potential burdens to a transient
defendant and found that they are slight.1 76  Three factors support his
conclusion: first, the availability of modem communications and transporta-
tion;lV second, service in the forum state, and hence presence at least once,
indicates that the forum is unlikely to be "prohibitively inconvenient;"1 8 and
finally, any burden accruing to the defendant from transient jurisdiction can
be mitigated through the use of modem procedural devices. 7 9
Justice Brennan placed significant weight on this last factor and cited
several devices available to defendants. In federal courts, the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure provide the means for early disposition of spurious suits as
well as inexpensive discovery devices such as the oral deposition by
telephone, and deposition on written questions."8  Federal law provides,
under some circumstances, for a change of venue within the federal courts
system.' Finally, the doctrine of forum non conveniens is available in
many state courts and may allow a defendant to have his case dismissed. 82
Ultimately, Justice Brennan determined that "as a rule the exercise of personal
to the state. For Justice Scalia's response to this factor in Justice Brennan's analysis,
see infra notes 190-91 and accompanying text.
174. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. 2125 (citing U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2).
175. Id. (citing Maltz, supra note 33, at 698-99). Professor Malz posits a
situation where T, a non-resident who is transiently present in the forum state F, owes
R, a resident of F, a sum of money. Should R attack T in an effort to recover his debt
directly from T's wallet, T could call on F's police and courts to protect him. Without
the doctrine of transient jurisdiction, however, R could not invoke the power of F to
recover his debt. Maltz, supra note 33, at 698-99.




180. Id. at 2125 n.13.
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jurisdiction over a defendant based on his voluntary" presence in the forum
will satisfy the requirements of due process."
184
C. Parting Shots'15
The final section of Justice Scalia's opinion is a response to the
concurring opinion of Justice Brennan.1 6 He attacked Justice Brennan's
decision that the Court should apply "contemporary notions of due pro-
cess" 1 7 in assessing the use of transient jurisdiction."' He characterized
the concurrence's proposed standard as "seductive," without precedent, and
requiring the application of "each Justice's subjective assessment of what is
fair and just."' 89
Justice Scalia recited the list of benefits of which Justice Brennan said
Husband had availed himself and retorted that a contract exchanging
jurisdictional power for those benefits would certainly be found to be
"unconscionable" under the Uniform Commercial Code." The absurdity
of Justice Brennan's position, as seen by Justice Scalia, is that all the benefits
of California which have accrued to Husband and which make it fair for
California courts to assert jurisdiction over him have also accrued to many
who were "fortunate enough" to escape the state without service of process
and over whom, it is clear, jurisdiction could not be asserted. 191
Justice Scalia applauded Justice Brennan's acknowledgment of one
"fairness" factor, that of Husband's "reasonable expectation" of being subject
to suit in California.192 This is correct, found Justice Scalia, only because
183. Justice Brennan is careful to note that, while the facts of the present case do
not require setting the outside boundaries, a defendant unknowingly or involuntarily
in a state will likely not be subject to the rule of transient jurisdiction as reaffirmed by
the Court. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2124 n.11, 2125, 2126.
184. Id. at 2125.
185. The critiques by Justice Scalia and Justice Brennan of the other's opinion
and view of the Court's role in due process analysis have been culled out of the
discussions above and will be dealt with in this separate section. Both Justice Scalia
and Justice Brennan end their opinions with footnotes, Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2119
n.5, 2125 n.14, which are, quite possibly, more illuminative of their positions than are
the balance of their respective opinions. It is this use of footnotes which gives rise to
the title for this section.
186. Id4 at 2117 (joined only by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy)
187. Id. at 2122.
188. Id. at 2117.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 2117-18.
192. Id. at 2118.
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of the long-standing tradition of transient jurisdiction; the very factor which
Justice Brennan has tried, unsuccessfully, to avoid.' 93  Justice Scalia
illustrated the circular nature of Justice Brennan's argument in a single
sentence: "The existence of a continuing tradition is not enough, fairness also
must be considered; fairness exists here because there is a continuing
tradition."194
Justice Scalia, unrelenting in his attack on Justice Brennan's opinion,
declared that not only is Justice Brennan "unwilling to confess that the
Justices of this Court can possibly be bound by... tradition..., neither is
[he] willing to embrace the logical consequences of that refusal-or even to
be clear about what consequences (logical or otherwise) [he] does em-
brace."' 95 Justice Scalia warned that when Justice Brennan states that "as
a rule"' 9 the use of transient jurisdiction is constitutional, he is giving
"nothing more than his estimation that, usually, all the elements of 'fairness'"
will be present.'7 Litigants should not rely on Justice Brennan's opinion
if their facts differ significantly from those presented by the present case.198
Justice Scalia cautioned that, despite the invocation of the word "rule,"
Justice Brennan is advocating nothing less than a "totality of the circumstanc-
es" test.' 99 This test, in which everything must be litigated, fosters the type
of uncertainty over preliminary issues which the traditional rules of territorial
jurisdiction were designed to avoid.2° This uncertainty may be a necessary
evil when the Court is faced with novel bases for jurisdiction adopted by the
states, such as those relying on extraterritorial service of process. 0' No
such justification for a "reasonableness" inquiry exists, however, when the
device at issue, physical presence, "has hitherto been considered the very
baseline of reasonableness."'2
Unlike the cannonade employed by Justice Scalia (attacking with
one-third of the text of his opinion), Justice Brennan was content to return
only small-arms fire, peppering Justice Scalia with footnotes. He began by
pointing out that the use of the word tradition in the phrase "traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice," meant simply that these two




196. ld. at 2125.
197. Id, at 2118 (emphasis in the original).
198. Id. at 2118-19.
199. Id. at 2119.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. (emphasis in original).
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limited by "pedigree" alone. The Court, in International Shoe, did not
intend to foreclose the use of -contemporary societal norms in due process
analysis.' Justice Brennan pointed out that Justice Scalia conceded that
tradition must, in some instances, give way to contemporary notions of
fairness, when he admitted that the thousand-year-old practice of acquiring
jurisdiction by force or fraud had largely disappeared from the common law
by the nineteenth century.2 Justice Brennan chided Justice Scalia for
assuming "that the evolution of our legal system, and the society in which it
operates, ended 100 years ago."'
Justice Brennan stated that the state courts which have upheld the
continued use of transient jurisdiction at least did so only after undertaking the
sort of independent due process analysis which Justice Scalia found unneces-
sary and prohibited to the Supreme Court.w The very fact of a debate
among the commentators illustrates that they have rejected Justice Scalia's
historically-bound approach.' In fact, notes Justice Brennan, several
commentators have directly challenged the history of transient jurisdiction
which lies at the core of Justice Scalia's argument." 9
Justice Brennan cautiously guarded the ability of the Supreme Court to
strike down, as violative of due process, unfair state court procedures. This
power continues in the Court even though the challenged procedure may enjoy
a long history and broad current application.20 To decide, as Justice Scalia
has, that the Due Process Clause does not grant the Supreme Court the power
to protect "out-of-staters"21' from unfair laws passed by "self-interested
states" 2 is to be "oblivious to the raison d'etre of various constitutional
doctrines . . . such as the art. IV Privileges and Immunities Clause and
Commerce Clause."213 Justice Brennan warned that, if the Court is power-
less to do anything but wait for states to rid themselves of a traditional
procedure which has become unjust, the wait could be substantial because the
states have little incentive to act.214
203. Id. at 2120 n.2 (emphasis added).
204. Id.
205. Id. at 2121 n.3.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 2121 n.4.
208. Id. at 2121 n.5.
209. Id. at 2122-24 nn.8-10. See supra notes 125, 167 and accompanying text.
210. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2121.
211. I& at 2125 n.14.
212. Id. at 2119 n.5.
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Justice Scalia responded by framing the question as "whether changes are
to be adopted as progressive by the American people or decreed as progressive
by the Justices of this Court., 215 He concluded that it is for our society, as
expressed through its laws, to determine what process is traditionally
considered to be due.216 The vague doctrines of the Commerce Clause and
the Privileges and Immunities Clause, raised by Justice Brennan, should not
serve as authority for the Court to prevent society from "greedy adherence to
its traditions."21 7 Justice Scalia found no authority to base due process on
whatever a shifting majority of the Court feels comports with their own
perceptions of fairness.218 To attempt to do so, Justice Scalia stated, can
only be described as imperious.
D. Justice White20
Justice White joined in much of Justice Scalia's opinion. He provided
the fourth vote for the statement that "jurisdiction based on physical presence
alone constitutes due process because it is one of the continuing traditions of
our legal system that define due process.""
Justice White could not join, however, Justice Scalia's interpretation of
Shaffer. Although Justice White "could not possibly" strike down the rule of
transient jurisdiction, m2 he was quick to point out that this was because of
the wide acceptance the rule still enjoyed and not because the Court lacked
the ability to do so. Justice White relied on Shaffer for the authority to
strike even traditionally accepted procedures,2 4 and in this interpretation he
implicitly joined Justice Brennan.225 What kept Justice White from explicit-
ly joining Justice Brennan was that, before ruling transient jurisdiction
unconstitutional, Justice White would require a showing that the rule is "so
arbitrary and lacking in common sense in so many instances" that the
continued use of the procedure would violate due process- in every case. 6
215. Id. at 2119.




220. Id at 2119.
221. Id. at 2115.
222. Id at 2119.
223. Id
224. Id
225. Id. at 2120.
226. Id. at 2119-20.
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Until this difficult threshold showing is made, "claims [of unfairness] in
individual cases... need not be entertained." 27
E. Justice Stevens'2
Justice Stevens refused to join in the opinion of any other Justice. In a
terse, four sentence opinion, Justice Stevens chastised both Justice Scalia and
Justice Brennan for the unnecessarily broad reach of their opinions and
referred the reader to his dissenting opinion in Shaffer."9  Citing the
"historical evidence and consensus" discussed by Justice Scalia, the "consider-
ations of fairness" addressed by Justice Brennan, and the "common sense
displayed" by Justice White, Justice Stevens found that the determination of
the continued constitutionality of transient jurisdiction is an easy case.23
Justice Stevens quipped that "[p]erhaps the adage about hard cases making bad
law should be revised to cover easy cases.""
IV. COMMENT
Burnham v. Superior Court of California, one author has already noted,
is "destined for all the textbooks."232 The question addressed by this section
is: Which chapter? This case makes important contributions to many areas
of constitutional and procedural law. Three such areas include: (1) the debate
as to whether sovereignty or fairness is the constitutional foundation for
personal jurisdiction; (2) the nationwide service of process and personal
jurisdiction in federal courts; and (3) the role of tradition in due process
analyses. The practical application of transient jurisdiction and its impact on
these areas are addressed below.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 2126.
229. Id. (citing Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 217 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment)).
In Shaffer, Justice Stevens stated, "My uncertainty as to the reach of the opinion, and
my fear that it purports to decide a great deal more than is necessary to dispose of this
case, persuade me merely to concur in the judgment." Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 219.
Interestingly, Justice Stevens' opinion in Shaffer also included his position on transient
jurisdiction: "If I visit another State... I knowingly assume some risk that the State
will exercise its power over my . . . person while there." Id. at 218 (cited by
Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2124 (J. Brennan, concurring in the judgment)).
230. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2126.
231. Id.
232. Mullenix, Badly Fractured Decisions Muddy Cases on Venue, NAT'L L. J.,
Aug. 13, 1990, at S9 (referring to the Burnham decision as "notorious"). For evidence
that this prediction will become reality, see M. ROSENBERG, H. SMET, R. DREYFUSS,
ELEMENTS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE-CASES AND MATERIALS 225-26 (5th ed. 1990).
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Given the vigorous nature and wide-ranging implications of the debate
among the Justices in Burnham, it is easy to overlook the conclusiveness of
their resolution of the question presented. This unanimous nature of the
judgment of the Court, however, will not be lost on state courts. Nine Justices
squarely faced the issue of whether personal service on a non-resident
individual intentionally present in the forum state, without more, was
sufficient to create personal jurisdiction over that individual. Nine Justices
held that it was. No glimmer of hope survives for future defendants "tagged"
in this manner. It should be a very long time before the validity of this
doctrine is questioned again.
This does not mean, however, that every application of transient
jurisdiction will be problem-free. It is important to note, for instance, that five
Justices required the defendant's presence in the forum state to be intentional
or voluntary and knowing. This requirement, arguably, could be used to
forestall the specter of Grace v. MacArthur,233 which is certain to be raised
by commentators.' The argument would be that potential defendants,
traveling in jetliners at altitudes of thirty thousand feet or more, are not aware
of each state as they pass over it, or at least that they have no intention of
being present in these states. This argument is likely to be accepted by these
same Justices. The entire Court, perhaps, could be persuaded by this
argument because this type of presence within a state cannot be considered to
have the substantial pedigree of the type of presence that has traditionally
made a defendant subject to service. 5
Additionally, practitioners will have to reacquaint236 themselves with
233. 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959). The district court in this case Vpheldjurisdiction over the defendant on the basis of his having been served process while
in an airplane over Arkansas. Interestingly, for a case so often cited in discussions of
transient jurisdiction, the court took transient jurisdiction for granted and the sole issue
was whether the defendant was within the territorial limits of Arkansas. Id. at 444-47.
234. This is, perhaps, one of the few cases to be cited more frequently by
commentators than by courts. See, e.g., Wemer, supra note 27, at 588-89 (characteriz-
ing this case as the most notorious of all transient jurisdiction cases).
235. Supporting this argument is the decision in Grace itself, which states "that
a time may come, and may not be far distant, when commercial aircraft will fly at
altitudes so high that it would be unrealistic to consider them as being within the
territorial limits of... any particular state." Grace, 170 F. Supp. at 447.
236. Beginning with the Supreme Court's decision in Shaffer, commentators have
de-emphasized the common law rules attendant to transient jurisdiction in anticipation
of the abrogation of that doctrine. An Arkansas appellate court spoke of this trend
with apparent relief: "The progressive emphasis on [minimum contacts] ... may
someday obviate the notion of mere presence as a basis, and we will no longer be
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the various common law exceptions and limitations to the doctrine of transient
jurisdiction. 7 Virtually all states will not recognize service on a defendant
who has been fraudulently induced to enter the forum, or has been brought
within the forum by force. 8 Many states grant immunity from service to
any person in the forum state solely to participate in legal proceedings.?
9
A minority extend this protection to persons in the state for arbitrations,
negotiations4 and administrative hearings.241  Several states refuse to
extend the immunity to defendants in criminal trials within the state,242 and
a very few states do not recognize any immunity for parties or witnesses at
all.
24 3
Another doctrine which will have to be re-examined in light of Burnham
is the doctrine of.special, or limited, appearances. The United States Supreme
Court, in York v. Tea=s, 244 has held that when a defendant enters a special
appearance simply to contest jurisdiction, a state may assert personal
jurisdiction over the defendant based on that appearance without violating due
process. s This holding has been severely criticize& but has never been
overruled by the Supreme Court.247 Currently, all fifty states recognize the
procedure of special appearancem" but a future retreat from this unanimity
would not seem to invoke the due process clause.
concerned with the problem presented when one is enticed or tricked into being present
in the court's jurisdiction." Oden Optical Co. v. Optique du Mond, Utd., 268 Ark.
1105, 1111, 598 S.W.2d 456, 459 (Ark. Ct. App. 1980).
237. These refinements vary from state to state and a comprehensive review is
beyond the scope of this Note. See generally Comment, supra note 37, at 198-202.
238. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 60, § 1076, at 502-04. See also Annotation,
Attack on Personal Service as Having Been Obtained by Fraud or Trickery, 98
A.L.R.2D 551 (1964).
239. R. CASAD, supra note 28, para. 1.06.
240. Id
241. Comment, supra note 37, at 200-02.
242. See Annotation, Immunity of Nonresident Defendant in Criminal Case from
Service of Process, 20 A.LR.2d 163 (1951).
243. Baisley v. Baisley, 113 Mo. 544, 21 S.W. 29 (1893).
244. 137 U.S. 15 (1890).
245. Id. at 20.
246. See, e.g., A. EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICr OF LAWS § 27,
at 90 n.15 (1962).
247. Several commentators, relying on the "apparent" demise of transient
jurisdiction, have cast this ruling aside. See, e.g., R. CASAD, supra note 28, at para.
3.0115][a][i]. One district court, however, relying on Burnham, has noted the
resurrection of this holding. Nippon Emo-Trans Co. v. Emo-Trans, Inc., 744 F. Supp.
1215, 1221 n.8 (E.D.N.Y. 1990).
248. R. CASAD, supra note 28, at para. 3.01[5][a][i].
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B. Constitutional Foundation for Personal Jurisdiction
The Supreme Court has often shifted its focus, from sovereignty to
fairness and back again, in analyzing the constitutional requirement of
personal jurisdiction. Before Pennoyer, reviews of state court jurisdiction
arose only in the context of a full faith and credit challenge. To be enforce-
able in another state, the court entering judgment had to have personal
jurisdiction over the defendant,29 acquired by either personal service on the
defendant while he was physically present within the forum, or by his
consent? °0 A court was free to fashion other methods of acquiring personal
jurisdiction, so long as interstate enforcement was not needed.251
The Supreme Court, in Pennoyer, incorporated these requirements into
the fourteenth amendment Due Process Clause and provided an avenue for
direct attack on a court's exercise of jurisdiction. The essence of Justice
Field's opinion in that case is that a court's jurisdiction arose from, and that
the Due Process Clause is a necessary limitation on the power of the sovereign
asserting jurisdiction.
Limiting the sovereign power of the states remained the sole justification
for a due process limitation on personal jurisdiction until the Supreme Court's
decision in International Shoe. This case introduced the more malleable
concepts of fairness and reasonableness as justifications for limiting a state
court's jurisdiction. 2
The Supreme Court, in Hanson v. Denckla, 3 was quick to point out,
however, that the minimum contacts test was "more than a guarantee of
immunity from inconvenien[ce,] .. . [it was] a consequence of territorial
limitations on the power of respective States."" 4 The focus shifted away
from sovereignty in Shaffer, in which Justice Marshall stated that in
jurisdictional analyses, the focus must be on "the relationship among the
defendant, the forum, and the litigation.",2
5
World Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson256 gave the Court reason,
again, to re-evaluate the balance between the two justifications. The minimum
contacts requirement "perform[s] two related, but distinguishable functions.
249. D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. 165, 174 (1850).
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317-20.
253. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
254. Id. at 251.
255. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 204. The language from Hanson concerning the dual
purposes of restrictions on jurisdiction was dismissed by Justice Marshall in a footnote.
Id. at 204 n.20.
256. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
1991]
29
Wilson: Wilson: Pedigree for Due Process
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
It protects the defendant [from unfair burdens] ... [a]nd it acts to ensure that
the States, through their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed
on them by their status as co-equal sovereigns in a federal system."05
7
The balance between these two justifications shifted dramatically again
in Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee. 25
Justice White, in reference to the federalism language in World Wide
Volkswagen, stated that the Due Process Claue "is the only source of the
personal jurisdiction requirement and the clause itself makes no mention of
federalism concerns." 9 He noted that if federalism were the key concern,
it would not be possible for a defendant to waive personal jurisdictiori.M
The restriction which the personal jurisdiction requirement places on a state's
sovereign power "must be seen as ultimately a function of the individual
liberty interest preserved by the Due Process Clause. '26'
The Supreme Court's decision in Burnham operates to shift the focus
back to sovereignty. Justice Scalia's reliance on history and tradition serve
to highlight that it is the sovereign power of the California state courts over
defendants present within their territory that is the interest at issue~2 and not
fairness to the defendant. Nothing in Justice Brennan's analysis is to the
contrary. Justice Brennan, perhaps caught between his career-long stand in
favor of broad state court jurisdictiono and his distrust of Justice Scalia's
tradition-bound analysis, purported to analyze the prospects for unfairness to
defendants under transient jurisdiction and concluded that they are insignifi-
cant.'  This is the most frustrating part of Justice Brennan's opinion
because transient jurisdiction, as he defined it, is concerned only with the
presence of, and not fairness to, the defendant. If the potential for unfairness
under this doctrine is insignificant under every member. of the Court's
analysis, is anything left of "fairness" as a constitutional justification for a due
process limitation on personal jurisdiction?
257. Id. at 291-92.
258. 456 U.S. 694 (1982).
259. Id. at 702 n.10.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. See supra notes 121-31 and accompanying text.
263. Leathers, Supreme Court Jurisdictional Voting Patterns Related to
Jurisdictional Issues, 62 WASH. L. REV. 631, 673-76 (1987). "Justice Brennan's
record is the clearest and best articulated of all the members of the Court." Id. at 673.
Justice Brennan, sometimes in the majority but often in the minority, has voted to
uphold state court jurisdiction in nine out of nine opportunities. Id. at 674-76.
264. See supra notes 176-84 and accompanying text.
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C. Nationwide Reach of Federal Courts
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorize service of process
anywhere in the state in which the district court sits; anywhere outside the
state which would be within the reach of that state's long-arm statute;
anywhere within a one hundred mile radius of the district court; and anywhere
specifically provided for by congressional act or other Rule.2  To date,
Congress has enacted several provisions for nationwide service of process for
specific causes of action in federal courts. 266 The power of Congress to
authorize such nationwide service is conclusively established. 7 The issue
of personal jurisdiction in federal courts, when service is made pursuant to a
nationwide service statute, is much less clear.
The Supreme Court has not had occasion to rule directly on what
standards district courts should apply when a defendant has been served
pursuant to a nationwide service provision enacted by Congress. In Stafford
v. Briggs,26 the Supreme Court reversed the First Circuit Court of Appeals
and found that the statute in question did not authorize nationwide service
under the present facts.269 In doing so, the Court did not reach the question
of personal jurisdiction under nationwide service. Justice Stewart, joined by
Justice Brennan, dissented and did reach this question. "The short answer to
[defendant's argument that they lacked minimum contacts with Rhode Island,
site of the District Court,] is that due process requires only certain minimum
contacts between the defendant and the sovereign that has created the
court."27 Justice Stewart also stated that "[tihe issue is not whether it is
unfair to... [the] defendant..., but rather whether the court of a particular
sovereign has power to exercise personal jurisdiction over a named defen-
265. FED. R. Civ. PROC. 4(e)-(f).
266. 2 J. MOORE, J. LUCAS, H. FINK & C. THOMPSON, MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE para. 4.33, 4.42(2.1) (2d ed. 1987). Three typical examples, their purposes
and applications, are discussed in Lusardi, Nationwide Service of Process: Due
Process Limitations on the Power of the Sovereign, 33 Viii. L. REV. 1, 8-23 (1988).
267. Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 442 (1946).
Because article III of the Constitution left to the discretion of Congress the manner in
which lower federal courts should be established, Congress could well have established
only a single district without reference to state lines. In this way, service of process
would run throughout the country. United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 98 U.S. 569, 602
(1878).
268. 444 U.S. 527 (1980).
269. Id. at 540-45.
270. ld. at 554 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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dant.""' The defendants were all residents of the United States and,
therefore, Justice Stewart found no due process violation.tm
No other Supreme Court cases address the issue of personal jurisdiction
in cases involving nationwide service of process. Most circuits addressing this
issue have held that "the defendant's aggregate contacts with the entire United
States provide the measure of minimum contacts necessary for personal
jurisdiction." t  The Sixth District Court of Appeals and several district
courts have stated that where nationwide service of process is provided, due
process requires only reasonable notice. These courts undertook no minimum
contacts analysis at all. 4 I
The Supreme Court, in Omni Capital International v. Rudolf Wolff &
Co.,2 5 declined the plaintiff's request that they adopt, as a matter of federal
common law, nationwide service of process in all federal question cases.276
"That responsibility, in our view, better rests with those who propose the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and with Congress."'2  Accepting the
challenge of the Supreme Court, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules has
proposed a new Rule 4 which provides not only for nationwide but also
world-wide service of process.278
The Supreme Court's decision in Burnham, and its emphasis on the
power of a sovereign over a defendant solely on the basis of that defendant's
transient presence within the sovereign's territory, will have substantial impact
271. Id. It should be noted that this dissenting statement by Justice Stevens in
Briggs emphasizing sovereignty pre-dates the majority decision of Justice White in
Insurance Corp. of Ireland and its emphasis on jurisdictional restraints as protective
of the defendants liberty interests. See supra notes 258-61 and accompanying text.
272. Briggs, 444 U.S. at 554. It is important, at this point, to emphasize that the
only constitutional limitation on a federal court's exercise of jurisdiction is the fifth
amendment Due Process Clause.
273. Erichson, Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction in All Federal Question Cases:
A New Rule 4, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1117, 1140-41 (1989).
274. Haile v. Henderson Nat'l Bank, 657 F.2d 816, 825 (6th Cir. 1981); see also
Erichson, supra note 273, at 1140 n.152. This would appear to be consistent, at least
so far as jurisdiction over United States residents, with Justice Stewart's conclusion in
Briggs. See supra notes 268-72 and accompanying text; see also Leroy v. Great
Western United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 192 (1979) (White, J., dissenting) (stating in
conclusory terms that there are "no restrictions imposed by the Constitution on the
exercise of jurisdiction by the United States over its residents").
275. 484 U.S. 97 (1987).
276. Id. at 111.
277. Id.
278. A complete analysis of this proposed change is beyond the scope of this
Note. For a comprehensive review and analysis of this new rule, its language, authors
and procedures for adoption, see Erichson, supra note 273.
384 [Vol. 56
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on the analysis of this new rule and the entire question of personal jurisdiction
in federal courts.279 A reasonable conclusion would seem to be that any
defendant served with process while within the United States, whether under
the new Rule 4 or other pre-existing nationwide service statute, would be
subject to the personal jurisdiction of the district court which issued the
summons, regardless of its location. This conclusion seems inevitable after
Burnham and its rejuvenation of the idea that a defendant, served within the
territory of a sovereign, is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts created by
that sovereign. Venue will, of course, limit the number of these fora available
to the plaintiff.2w It is, however, debatable whether the defendant's interests
in a fair forum are adequately protected by statutory, rather than constitutional,
means.
D. A Pedigree for Due Process
In Michael H. v. Gerald D.,2' the Supreme Court faced the issue of
whether or not a natural father had a constitutionally protected liberty interest
in his parental relationship with a child whose mother was married to, and
cohabitating with, another man at the time of the child's conception and birth.
Justice Scalia, with whom Chief Justice Rehnquist joined, delivered the
opinion of an extremely divided court.8 The Court held that the state law
statutory presumption, preventing the natural father from establishing paternity
at an evidentiary hearing, did not violate either the natural father's, or the
daughter's, due process rights, nor did the statute violate the daughter's equal
protection rights.283 Justice Scalia surveyed the long-standing history and
current broad-based support for this type of statutory presumption and stated
that "[iun this case, the existence of such a tradition, continuing to the present
day, refutes any possible contention that the [natural father's] alleged right is
-'so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."'"
279. This is supported by those commentators relying heavily on the "fairness"
justification for due process limitations on personal jurisdiction to ameliorate the
impact of nationwide service of process. See Erichson, supra note 273, at 1140-44;
Lusardi, supra note 266, at 32-48; Note, Pendant Personal Jurisdiction and
Nationwide Service of Process, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 113, 128-30 (1989).
280. Erichson, supra note 273, at 1135-38. This will come as little comfort,
however, to corporate defendants for whom venue is proper anywhere that personal
jurisdiction lies. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1988).
281. 109 S. Ct. 2333 (1989).
282. Id. at 2333.
283. Id. at 2333-46.
284. Id at 2344 n.6. (citations omitted).
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In a maneuver which demonstrates the deep division within the court,
Justice O'Connor and Justice Kennedy joined Justice Scalia in his entire
opinion, with the exception of a single footnote.285 In this footnote, Justice
Scalia responds to Justice Brennan's criticism of his use of tradition in due
process analysis by stating, "Although assuredly having the virtue (if it be
that) of leaving judges free to decide as they think best... , a rule of law that
binds neither by text nor by any particular, identifiable tradition, is no rule of
law at all. ,
296
Justice Brennan, writing in dissent, issued a scathing attack on Justice
Scalia's tradition-bound method of analysis, which Justice Brennan character-
izes as both "novel" and "misguided."2 7 Justice Brennan went on to state:
The document that the plurality construes today is unfamiliar to me. It is
not the living charter that I have taken to be our Constitution; it is instead
a stagnant, archaic, hidebound document steeped in the prejudices and
superstitions of a time long past. This Constitution does not recognize that
times change, does not see that sometimes a practice or rule outlives its
foundations. I cannot accept an interpretive method that does such violence
to the charter that I am bound by my oath to uphold.
2W
The next Term, in Burnham, Justice Scalia advanced substantially the
same argument and received substantially the same response from Justice
Brennan. This time, however, Justice Kennedy, who abandoned Justice
Scalia's use of binding tradition in Michael H., joined Justice Scalia's entire
opinion. He and Chief Justice Rehnquist, who voted with Justice Scalia in
Michael H., comprise the three-Justice "tradition faction."
With the 1989 Term almost at a close, Justice Scalia initiated the third
round of this continuing battle. This time the battlefield was to be the first
amendment. In Rutan v. Republican Party,28 9 the Supreme Court held that
hirings, promotions, transfers and recalls based on political affiliation or
support are impermissible infringements on public employees' first amendment
rights.2  Justice Scalia, with whom Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Kennedy joined, and with whom Justice O'Connor joined only in part,29'
authored the dissent.2 2
285. Id. at 2346.
286. Id. at 2344 n.6.
287. Id. at 2351 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
288. IL
289. 110 S. Ct. 2729 (1990).
290. 1& at 2739 (Brennan, J., writing for the Court).
291. Justice O'Connor, again, joins all of Justice Scalia's opinion except that
section which argues that tradition should be given dispositive effect.
292. Id. at 2746.
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Justice Scalia attacked the majority for their practice of ignoring tradition:
"[W]hen a practice not expressly prohibited by the text of the Bill of Rights
bears the endorsement of long tradition of open, widespread, and unchallenged
use that dates back to the beginning of the Republic, we have no proper basis
for striking it down."m The Framers of the Bill of Rights, Justice Scalia
urged, intended only to protect "long-recognized personal liberties" from
transient majorities, not to create new rights contrary to accepted political
norms. 4 Citing his opinion in Burnham, Justice Scalia decried the current
Court practice of "examin[ing] a historical practice, endow[ing] it with an
intellectual foundation, and later, by simply undermining that foundation,
relegat[ing] the constitutional tradition to the dustbin of history. ' 295
Responding on this occasion was Justice Stevens, who wrote a separate
concurring opinion.296 Justice Stevens challenged Justice Scalia's depiction
of the relevant history297 and quoted extensively from his own Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Illinois State Employees Union v.
Lewis293 as support to counter many assertions made by Justice Scalia.
29
Justice Stevens ultimately dismissed, out of hand, Justice Scalia's assertion
that tradition should be given dispositive effect by stating simply that the
argument is "advanced in two plurality opinions that Justice Scalia has
authored, but not by any opinion joined by a majority of the Members of this
Court. ,
a1
This, then, is the "fundamental constitutional debate" which Ms.
Greenhouse noted in the quotation which opened this Note. Is the Supreme
Court, absent an express prohibition found in the Bill of Rights, bound by the
pedigree of whatever right or procedure may be before it, or is it free to
re-evaluate these doctrines under modern notions of fairness and justice?
How, then, will these notions themselves be tested?
This debate is, of course, not a new one.? Nor is it likely to be
293. Id. at 2748.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 2749 n.2.
296. Id. at 2740.
297. Id. at 2741 n.3, 2744 n.4.
298. 473 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 928 (1973).
299. Rutan v. Republican Party, 110 S. Ct. 2729, 2740-46 (1990).
300. Id. at 2752.
301. Id. at 2741.
302. "The fact that a procedure is so old as to have become customary and well
known in the community is of great weight in determining whether it conforms to due
process for 'Not lightly vacated is the verdict of quiescent years."' Anderson Nat'l
Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 244 (1944) (quoting Coler v. The Corn Exch. Bank,
250 N.Y. 136, 141, 164 N.E. 882, 884 (1928) (Cardozo, J.)). It is unlikely, however,
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resolved by this Court or future Courts. At the close of the 1989 Term, the
Court stood divided by a vote of 6-3' in favor of more wide-open review.
The majority view, however, lost a powerful advocate when Justice Brennan
retired and it remains to be seen how Justice Souter will affect this debate.
V. CONCLUSION
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Burnham, the doctrine of
transient jurisdiction was approved by virtually every court in the United
States. It is difficult to characterize a case as landmark which, arguably,
makes no change in the law. This characterization, however, is justified for
Burnham. Although the full impact of this decision must await future
decisions of the Court, it may well mark the beginning of the Court's
withdrawal from the standards of International Shoe and constitutional
protection for defendants from litigation in unfair fora.
PAUL C. WILSON
that Judge Cardozo would countenance a method of analyses that could be framed as:
Never vacated is the verdict of quiescent years.
303. At present, those Justices arguing that "pedigree" should be given preclusive
effect are Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Scalia.
At the close of the 1989 Term, those Justices voting that tradition should be
given some, but not conclusive, weight were Justice Blackmun, Justice Brennan,
Justice Marshall, Justice O'Connor, Justice Stevens, and Justice White.
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